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Restrictions on international capital transactions and other payments are usually 
designed to limit volatile short-term capital flows (“hot money”) and stabilize the 
exchange rate. Their imposition, however, may have the opposite effect by 
inadvertently signaling the continuation of macroeconomic imbalances and 
inconsistent (“bad”) future policy (Bartolini and Drazen, 1997a,b). This paper 
investigates these alternative hypotheses by testing the impact of restrictions on 
international capital flows and other payments controls on the likelihood of currency 
crises. We employ a comprehensive sample of 90 developing and emerging-market 
economies over the 1975-1997 period, identifying 160 currency crises. Restrictions on 
international capital flows, current accounts, and international payments are 
associated with a higher probability of the onset of a speculative attack on the 
currency. This finding is robust to alternative measures of liberalization on 
international payments and the exchange rate regime, controlling for macroeconomic 
determinants of currency instability, and taking into account instability emanating 
from the banking sector. There may be some individual exceptions but the weight of 
the evidence suggests that countries imposing capital restrictions are sending a “bad 
signal” to markets, in turn increasing the likelihood of a net capital outflow and a 
currency crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the East Asian, Russian, and Brazilian currency crises of the 
1990s, many economists and policymakers have focused on large and volatile capital 
flows as an underlying source of instability to the international financial system. 
Conventional wisdom holds that liberalization of international capital flows, especially 
when combined with fixed exchange rates, is either an underlying cause or at least a 
contributing factor behind the rash of currency crises experienced in recent years. A 
common policy prescription under these circumstances is to impose restrictions on capital 
flows and other international payments with the hope of insulating economies from 
speculative attacks and thereby creating greater currency stability.  
Why might international capital flows be such a destabilizing force for developing 
and emerging-market economies? The presumption is that financial liberalization, and 
liberalization of international capital flows in particular, have encouraged a surge of 
short-term capital inflows (“hot money”) that are very unstable. These funds may be 
particularly footloose, seeking the highest global return, and quite speculative in nature. 
Hence, funds are likely to flow out of a country just as quickly as they flow in, often 
without any fundamental cause, leading to currency crises with severe economic 
consequences (e.g. Stiglitz, 2000).  Maintaining a fixed exchange rate is very difficult in 
these circumstances as expectations of eventual devaluation exacerbate the currency 
outflow, swamping the resources of governments (especially international reserves) to 
defend the currency without a very large contraction in monetary and fiscal policy. In this 
view, restricting capital flows, particularly volatile short-term capital, is necessary to  2 
reduce excessive currency instability. We term this argument the “hot money” hypothesis 
of the likely effects of capital account restrictions.   
An alternative view, however, holds that restrictions on the international capital 
account may have the opposite effect of that intended and lead to a greater likelihood of 
currency instability or at least lead to more dramatic collapses of the exchange rate 
regime once a problem arises. Two main strands of literature may be identified 
supporting this hypothesis. First, legal capital restrictions may prove ineffective, easily 
sidestepped by domestic and foreign residents and firms, and lead to economic distortions 
and government corruption that contribute to economic instability (Edwards, 1999c). The 
second argument is that the imposition (or existence) of capital controls may signal the 
introduction (continuance) of poorly designed economic policy and a deterioration of 
economic fundamentals, in turn inducing a capital outflow or cessation of inflow.
1 
Bartolini and Drazen (1997a, 1997b) and Drazen (1997), building on the work of Dooley 
and Isard (1980), consider this channel formally. Bartolini and Drazen (1997), for 
example, present a model in which a government’s current capital control policy signals 
future policies. When there is uncertainty over “government types,” a policy of restricting 
capital flows sends a unfavorable signal that may trigger a capital outflow and currency 
crisis.  In this view, the removal of existing controls makes investors more willing to 
invest in a country, as it is easier to get their capital out in the future. We term this 
alternative view about the likely effects of capital controls the “policy signaling” 
hypothesis.  
                                                 
1  Fraga (1999), for example, relates his experience at the central bank of Brazil where he found 
that capital controls gave policymakers a false sense of security and probably allowed Brazil to 
void or postpone a number of important macroeconomic policy changes and structural reforms.  3 
Despite the renewed popularity of international capital controls, and the 
theoretical and practical ambiguity over their effectiveness, relatively little systematic 
empirical work has been undertaken in this area (Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés, 2000). 
Several papers have investigated the experiences of capital controls for one or a few 
countries (e.g. Edison and Reinhart, 2000; Edwards, 1999a, 1999b; Gregorio, et al., 
2000). Gregorio, et al. (2000), for example, investigate the Chilean experience with using 
unremunerated reserve requirements as a means to control international capital flows. 
Edison and Reinhart (2000) study the effect of capital controls on the currency crises of 
Malaysia and Thailand in 1997-98. However, we are aware of no studies that investigate 
these issues in a broader context of developing and emerging-market economies. Clearly, 
at a minimum, a broader investigation would be beneficial to help judge the robustness of 
numerous case studies. Edison and Reinhart (2000), for example, conclude from their 
study “…that one cannot draw general policy conclusions from the results of this paper as 
they are based on a scanty set of experiences” (p. 20). 
This study attempts to fill this gap in the literature. The objective is to test the 
“hot money” and “policy signaling” hypotheses by systematically investigating the 
impact of capital controls and other restrictions on international payments on the 
likelihood of a speculative attack on the currencies of a large sample of developing and 
emerging-market countries. We investigate the occurrence of currency crises over time, 
and characterize their likelihood by the degree of international payments market 
restrictions and by the form of exchange rate regime (i.e. degree of exchange rate 
“fixity”). More formally, we employ a model of currency crises as a benchmark from 
which to test alternative hypotheses about the effects of capital controls. In particular, we  4 
investigate whether capital controls effectively insulate countries—lower the 
probability—from a currency attack, or instead tend to exacerbate currency problems, 
after controlling for a host of factors typically associated with currency instability.  
Section 2 reviews the literature on currency crises, focusing on the link with 
capital market liberalization, and formulates the key hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 
describes the empirical methodology and data. Section 4 presents an overview of the 
data, providing descriptive statistics and the frequencies of currency crises conditional 
upon the form of controls on international payments. Section 5 presents the results from 
testing the effect of capital market restrictions on the likelihood of currency crises using a 
probit model. Alternative probit models are estimated, controlling for macroeconomic 
conditions, the form of exchange rate regime, and the occurrence of banking instability. 
Section 6 concludes the study.     
  
2.  Limiting Hot Money or Signaling Bad Policies? Effects of Capital Controls  
2.1  Selective Literature Review 
The idea of restricting capital mobility as a means of reducing macroeconomic 
instability has a long history. Indeed, stringent restrictions and limitations on capital 
flows were the norm during the Bretton Woods era and, over much of the immediate 
post-war period, were officially sanctioned by most governments in the large industrial 
countries and by the International Monetary Fund. With the turbulence in exchange 
markets following the introduction of generalized floating, Tobin (1978) argued that a 
global tax on foreign exchange transactions would reduce destabilizing speculation in 
international financial markets. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) proposed Tobin-taxes  5 
to discourage short-term speculators from betting against major currencies. Directing 
attention to developing and emerging-market economies, Krugman (1999) proposed 
limiting capital flows for countries that were unsuitable for either currency unions or free 
floating. In a similar vein, Stiglitz (1999) and others (e.g. Ito and Portes, 1998; and 
Eichengreen, 1999) argue that developing countries should manage and limit capital 
flows.  
Another argument for controls is to impose them once a crisis is underway—a 
form of controls termed (but not advocated) “curative controls” by Edwards (1999b)—as 
opposed to restrictions on capital flows during normal periods. Krugman (1998) argues 
that countries facing a major crisis could benefit from the temporary imposition (or 
tightening) of controls on outflows. Once these curative controls are in place, interest 
rates may be lowered (from the high levels at the beginning of the crisis) and pro-growth 
policies put in place. Controlling capital outflows would in essence give some breathing 
room for crisis-managers, giving them additional time to restructure their financial sector. 
After the crisis has passed, the capital controls could be dismantled. This argument 
suggests the timing of capital controls, and their permanent versus temporary nature, is 
important in determining their effectiveness.  
The effect of capital controls may be quite different than that intended by 
proponents, however. Restrictions on the international capital account may in fact lead to 
a net capital outflow and precipitate increased financial instability. Dooley and Isard 
(1980) point out that controls preventing investors from withdrawing capital from a 
country act like investment irreversibility. Their removal makes investors more willing to 
invest in a country, as it is easier to get their capital out in the future. Following this  6 
reasoning, Bartolini and Drazen (1997a,b) show that the effect of capital controls may 
stem from their role as a signal of future government policies. A regime of free capital 
mobility may signal that the imposition of controls is less likely in the future, consistent 
with policies that are more favorable to investment. The ultimate purpose of capital 
controls in their model is to widen the tax base, and the governments with the weakest 
fiscal structures are likely to impose controls even though this may lead to a lower 
expected tax base (Bartolini and Drazen, 1997a).  The argument is that the government's 
type—the nature of its revenue constraints—is unobserved. Future imposition of controls 
on outflows makes it less desirable to invest in that country currently, giving “good” 
governments (i.e. those not needing the broader tax base) the incentive to allow free 
capital mobility in order to signal good future investment prospects. Capital flows in if 
the signal is successful.  
Bartolini and Drazen (1997a) show that a government may nonetheless impose 
capital controls, even though this is a “bad signal,” and cause lower capital inflows on 
average. The reason is that, in a stochastic setting, imposing capital controls gives the 
government access to an additional part of the tax base and helps insure it against revenue 
losses from other sources following a bad state of nature. Hence, it would be willing to 
accept lower expected taxes to help ensure a more stable tax revenue stream. The key to 
their paper is explaining why some governments impose capital controls, even though it 
may be interpreted as a bad signal for foreign (and domestic) investors, and other 
governments do not (Drazen, 2000).  
The second argument is of a more practical nature, questioning the ability of 
governments to effectively control capital flows and highlighting their distortionary and  7 
corrupting influence. Edwards (1999c) argues that legal capital restrictions frequently 
prove ineffective, and are easily sidestepped by domestic and foreign residents and firms. 
He also documents how capital controls may lead to economic distortions and 
government corruption that contribute to economic instability.  
 
2.2  Empirical Literature 
Bartolini and Drazen (1997a) identify some stylized facts about capital controls. 
First, they find that capital controls are much more common among developing 
economies than industrial economies. At the beginning of 1995, for example, capital 
controls were used by 126 of 158 developing economies, but only in 3 of 24 OECD 
countries. Second, capital controls are predominantly aimed at restricting capital 
outflows. Third, capital controls are aimed at two main objectives—to enhance 
government revenues (by broadening the tax base, imposing an inflation tax, or enforcing 
low interest rates on government debt) or to support fixed- or managed-exchange rate 
policies. Finally, Bartolini and Drazen survey a number of episodes of capital account 
liberalization, finding that the easing of restrictions on capital outflows often represented 
early ingredients of a broad set of reforms (including the lifting of various elements of 
financial repression) and frequently led to large capital inflows. 
Several papers have investigated the experiences of capital controls for one or 
several select countries (e.g. Edison and Reinhart, 2000; Edwards, 1999a, 1999b; 
Gregorio, et al., 2000). Gregorio, et al. (2000), for example, investigate the Chilean 
experience with using unremunerated reserve requirements as a means to control 
international capital flows. They examine the effects on interest rates, the real exchange  8 
rate, and the volume and composition of capital flows. They find the effects to be 
elusive—no significant long-run effects on interest rate differentials and no effects on the 
real exchange rate were identified. Capital controls in Chile, however, did apparently tilt 
the composition of inflows toward a longer maturity. Using various econometric tests and 
a detailed case study of Chilean controls imposed in 1981, Edwards (1999a) finds that  
“…the relative absence of contagion effect on Chile is due to its sturdy banking 
regulation and not to its capital controls policy” (p. 22), and that these restrictions did not 
have a significant effect on interest rate behavior. 
Edison and Reinhart (2000) study the effect of capital controls following the 1997 
currency crises of Malaysia and Thailand. In the face of speculative attacks, the Thai 
authorities imposed capital controls from May 1997 to late January 1998 (the baht was 
floated in July 1997). The Malaysian authorities imposed a number of administrative 
exchange and capital control measures in September 1998 aimed at containing ringgit 
speculation and the outflow of capital. A key difference between the cases is that 
Thailand was undergoing speculative attacks and tired to use capital controls as a defense 
mechanism, while Malaysia was not experiencing extreme speculative pressure when 
controls were applied. Edison and Reinhart examine monthly data to glean the effects of 
controls on economic performance, foreign exchange reserves, and capital flows. They 
also investigated daily financial variables, testing for the effects of controls on price 
changes and volatility. Edison and Reinhart conclude that the controls used in Thailand 
did not help to achieve the desired objectives, while those in Malaysia apparently did 
help achieve greater exchange rate stability and more policy autonomy (although initially 
these measures did not prevent mutual funds from exiting the country).      9 
Bartolini and Drazen (1997a) document that a liberalization of capital flows in 
many countries has led to larger capital inflows in several case studies. Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti (1995) present empirical results on a large number of possible determinants of 
capital controls. They use a zero-one dummy indicating whether capital controls are in 
place or not in a sample of 20 OECD countries, testing whether this index is linked to a 
variety of political and institutional determinants. They find that controls are more likely 
to be imposed by governments that have direct influence over monetary policy. Controls 
are also more prevalent when inflation and seignorage revenues are relatively large. 
Bartolini and Drazen (1997b) extend the approach of Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti to a 
sample of 73 developing countries over the 1970-94 period. They construct an index of 
restrictions on capital outflows as a simple average of IMF listings of restrictions on 
payments for capital transactions, restricting repatriation of export proceeds in a given 
year, and enforcing multiple exchange rates. They link a high degree of restrictions with 
high world real interest rates—measured as the weighted real interest rate in the G-7 
industrial countries—in a yearly time-series bivariate regression. They view the causality 
as running from world interest rates to capital restrictions: restrictions are removed when 
the cost of doing so is low, i.e. only a small outflow of capital is expected when world 
interest are low.   
Closest to our study, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) also investigate the effects 
of restrictions on capital flows on macroeconomic outcomes. They find that capital 
controls have a significant negative effect on debt accumulation, interpreting their use as 
a means of enforcing financial repression of the economy. Capital controls may serve to 
increase tax revenues via the seignorage effect, making it easier to finance spending  10 
without debt accumulation, but also to keep real interest rates on government debt 
artificially low by limiting international arbitrage in asset markets. They find support for 
this proposition—capital controls are associated with lower domestic interest rates after 
controlling for the level of domestic debt. Lewis (1997) finds that countries imposing 
capital controls have more highly correlated domestic consumption and output 
fluctuations, suggesting that they participate less in the international risk sharing 
opportunities associated with world capital market integration.  
In sum, we are aware of no empirical studies that investigate the link between 
capital controls (and exchange restrictions generally) on currency stability in a broader 
context of developing and emerging-market economies.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Given this literature review, two alternative and easily testable hypotheses about 
the likely effects of capital controls may be identified. The first, and most conventional, 
view is that the imposition of exchange controls is a useful policy instrument to limit 
capital flows and enhance exchange rate stability. This is the “limiting ‘hot’ money” 
hypothesis. The second view is that the imposition of capital controls may signal poorly 
designed future policy, leading to a loss of confidence, currency flight, and an exchange 
rate regime collapse. We term this the “signaling bad policy” hypothesis. Our objective is 
to systemically test these hypotheses in the context of a broad sample of developing and 
emerging-market economies.  
Other questions of interest in this context include: Has the frequency of currency 
crises grown in tandem with the move to decontrol international capital movements?  11 
And, are relatively wealthy and open emerging-market economies more likely to 
experience currency crises than the broader group of developing economies?  
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
3.1  Defining Currency Crises  
Currency crises are typically defined as “large” changes in some indicator of 
actual or potential currency value. Some studies focus on episodes of large depreciation 
alone  (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1996), while others include episodes of speculative 
pressure. The exchange rate does not always adjust during episodes of speculative 
pressure because the authorities successfully defended the currency by intervening in the 
foreign exchange market or raising domestic interest rates (e.g. Eichengreen, Rose, and 
Wyplosz, 1995; Moreno, 1995; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Alternative criteria have 
been employed in the literature for identifying “large” changes in currency value or 
pressure relative to what is considered  “normal.” Some studies employ an exogenous 
threshold rate of depreciation common to all countries in the analysis (e.g., Frankel and 
Rose, 1996; Kumar, Moorthy, and Penaudin, 1998). Other studies, by contrast, define the 
threshold in terms of country-specific moments (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; 
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart, 1998; IMF, 1998; Esquivel and Larrain, 1998; Glick 
and Moreno, 1998; Moreno, 1999).
2  
Our indicator of currency crises is constructed from “large” changes in an index 
of currency pressure, defined as a weighted-average of monthly real exchange rate 
                                                 
2  Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Berg and Patillo (1999) evaluate the predictive power of a 
range of model methodologies and definitions for the 1997 Asia crisis. 
  12 
changes and monthly (percent) reserve losses.
3 The weights are inversely related to the 
variance of changes of each component over the sample for each country. Our measure 
presumes that any nominal currency changes associated with exchange rate pressure 
should affect the purchasing power of the domestic currency, i.e. result in a change in the 
real exchange rate (at least in the short run). This condition excludes some large 
depreciations that occur during high inflation episodes, but it avoids screening out sizable 
depreciation events in more moderate inflation periods for countries that have 
occasionally experienced periods of hyperinflation and extreme devaluation.
4 Large 
changes in exchange rate pressure are defined as changes in our pressure index that 
exceed the mean plus 2 times the country-specific standard deviation, provided that it 
also exceeds 5 percent.
5, 6   
 
                                                 
3 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defense involving sharp 
rises in interest rates. Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of 
the sample period in many of the developing countries in our dataset. 
 
4 This approach differs from that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, who deal with 
episodes of hyperinflation by separating the nominal exchange rate depreciation observations 
for each country according to whether or not inflation in the previous 6 months was greater 
than 150 percent, and they calculate for each subsample separate standard deviation and mean 
estimates with which to define exchange rate crisis episodes. 
5  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a three standard deviation cut-off. While the choice of cut-
off point is somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) and Kumar, Moorthy, and Perraudin 
(1998) suggest that the results are not very sensitive to the precise cut-off chosen in selecting 
crisis episodes. 
  13 
3.2  Restrictions on International Payments  
We consider three measures of financial control liberalization on international payments 
derived from the IMF classifications contained in the Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (EAER). A country is classified as either 
“liberalized” (value of unity) or not (value of zero) in terms of the capital account (KAL), 
current account (CAL), and requirements to surrender export proceeds (SEL). These are 
quite rudimentary measures of balance of payments restrictions and, by providing only a 
dichotomous indication of the existence of controls, do not allow one to measure 
variations in the intensity of controls and enforcement. This is the only internationally 
comparable data available, however, and we hope to judge the robustness of the basic 
results on capital controls restrictions by using three alternative measures of balance of 
payments restrictions.    
  Specifically, for the 1975-84 period EAER coded countries (published in the 
reports through 1995) for the existence (or not) of balance of payments restrictions and 
controls on export proceeds as follows: "restrictions on payments for capital 
transactions", "restrictions on payments of current transactions", "surrender or 
repatriation requirement for export proceeds." We used these categorizations, 
respectively, for our KAL, CAL and SEL measures. From 1995, EAER began (starting 
                                                                                                                                                 
6  We have also constructed an alternative measure of currency crises following Esquivel and 
Larrain (1998) that employs a hybrid condition: the monthly depreciation in the (real) exchange 
rate either (i) exceeds 15 percent, provided that the depreciation rate is also substantially (e.g., 
two times) higher than that in the previous month, or (ii) exceeds the country-specific mean 
plus 2 standard deviations of the real exchange rate monthly growth rate, provided that it also 
exceeds 5 percent. The first condition insures that any large (real) depreciation is counted as a 
currency crisis, while the second condition attempts to capture changes that are sufficiently 
large relative to the country-specific monthly change of the (real) exchange rate. The results of 
our analysis are unaffected by use of this alternative measure.  14 
with the 1996 Annual Report) to disaggregate controls on export proceeds as follows: 
"repatriation requirements for export proceeds" and "surrender requirements for export 
proceeds." We use the second, more restrictive, of these measures for our SEL category 
for the 1996-97 observations. From 1996, EAER (starting with the 1997 Annual Report) 
categorized balance of payments restrictions as follows: "controls on payments for 
invisible transactions and current transfers" and 10 separate categories for controls on 
capital transactions (11 categories in the 1998 Annual Report). We used the first EAER 
categorization directly for the 1996-97 CAL observations. We defined the capital account 
to be restricted for the 1996-97 observations (i.e. not liberalized, so that KAL= 0) if 
controls were in place in 5 or more of the EAER sub-categories of capital account 
restrictions and "financial credit" was one of the categories restricted.
7   
We also consider domestic financial liberalization (FinL), defined as the decontrol 
of interest rates on bank deposits, as an additional factor influencing capital flight and 
currency stability. This series is from Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) but has 
been augmented to cover additional countries with information from Williamson and 
Mahar (1998), Honohan(1995), Galbis (1993), and other IMF studies. 
 
3.3  Determinants of Currency Crises  
An important part of our work is to identify appropriate control variables in our 
multivariate probit models. We want to ensure that empirical links between external 
                                                 
7 The 11 classifications under capital restrictions reported in the 1998 and 1998 EAERs were 
controls on: (1) capital market securities, (2) money market instruments, (3) collective 
investment securities, (4) derivatives and other instruments, (5) commercial credits, (6) 
financial credits, (7) guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities, (8) direct investment,  15 
controls, exchange rate regimes and currency crises are not spurious, attributable to 
variables omitted from the probit regressions. The theoretical and empirical literature has 
identified a vast array of variables potentially associated with currency crises (see, e.g. 
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart, 1998; Frankel and Rose, 1996). The choice of 
explanatory variables in our benchmark model for the analysis was determined by the 
questions we posed earlier, the availability of data, and previous results found in the 
literature. We postulate a “canonical” model of currency crises in order to form a basic 
starting point to investigate the effects of financial liberalization. We examine simple 
models with few explanatory variables. The main source of the macro data is the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM) and the 
exchange rate regime classification data is from the International Monetary Fund's 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
Our  “control variables” are lagged to avoid simultaneity problems and determine 
predictive ability. The lagged macroeconomic control variables, following Glick and 
Hutchison (2000) and others, are export growth, the log ratio of broad money to foreign 
reserves, credit growth, the current account to GDP ratio and whether the country 
recently experienced the onset of a banking crisis.
8 We also control for the form of 
exchange rate regime (lagged), defined as a discretely varying variable by assigning a 
number value on a scale of 0 to 1 according to a country’s exchange rate classification in 
                                                                                                                                                 
(9) liquidation of direct investment, (10) real estate transactions, and (11) personal capital 
movements.  
8 The banking crisis data are from Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 1999). 
  16 
a given year, with higher values indicating greater exchange rate fixity.
9 This variable is 
labeled "Exchange rate fixity t-1" in the tables. Finally, we also consider whether a major 
banking crisis occurred around the time of the currency crisis. The banking crisis variable 
was constructed as a binary variable, with unity indicating the onset of a banking crisis, 
i.e. first year of a period of bank distress and zero otherwise.
10 These variables are 
frequently employed in currency crisis studies and are often found to have (some) 
predictive power (Berg and Patillo, 1999; Glick and Hutchison, 2000).  
We expect export growth (in U.S. dollars) to be relatively slow, and the growth 
rate of M2/foreign reserves to be relatively high, prior to a currency crisis. A slowdown 
in export growth indicates a decline in foreign exchange earnings that in turn may set up 
the expectation—and speculative pressure—of a currency decline. A rise in the 
M2/foreign reserves ratio implies a decline in the foreign currency backing of the short-
term domestic currency liabilities of the banking system (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). 
This would make it difficult to stabilize the currency if sentiment shifts against it. Similar 
reasoning suggests that a larger current account surplus-to-GDP ratio would be expected 
to lessen the likelihood of a currency crisis, while rapid credit growth would be 
anticipated to precede a currency crisis.  
Further, countries with greater exchange rate rigidity might be more likely to 
experience overvalued currencies and eventually face speculative runs and sharp 
                                                 
9 Specifically, a country-year observation categorized as an independent float is assigned a value 
of 0, a managed float a value of 0.1; a wide-band crawling peg, 0.2; a narrow-band crawling 
peg, or adjustment by indicators, 0.3; a peg with “frequent” changes, 0.4; a cooperative floating 
arrangement, 0.5; basket peg, 0.6; de facto peg, 0.7; SDR peg, 0.8; and a single currency peg, 
0.9. 
  17 
devaluation. Finally, the “twin crisis” phenomenon suggests that a domestic banking 
crisis could make a speculative attack on the currency more likely (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Glick and Hutchison, 2000).  Several other variables were considered but 
not included in the reported regressions (for brevity) since they did not increase 
explanatory power.
11  
    
3.4  Data Sample and Windows 
Our data sample is determined by the theoretical determinants of currency market 
volatility and by the availability of data. We do not confine our analysis to countries 
experiencing currency crises. That is, we include developing countries that did not 
experience a severe currency crisis/speculative attack during the 1975-97 sample period. 
Using such a broad control group allows us to make general statements about the 
conditions distinguishing countries encountering crises and others managing to avoid 
crises.  
The minimum data requirements to be included in our study are that GDP are 
available for a minimum of 10 consecutive years over the period 1975-97. This 
requirement results in a sample of 90 developing and emerging-market countries. We 
have 32 emerging economies, 58 other developing and transition economies.
12 We use 
annual crisis observations in our analysis. While we employ monthly data for our (real) 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 We report results using only Caprio and Klingebiel’s (1996, 1999) “major” or “systemic” bank 
crisis; the results are similar with their more inclusive measure of crises. 
11 We also do not consider possible contagion effects during currency crises. See Glick and Rose 
(1999).  18 
exchange rate pressure index to identify currency crises and date each by the year in 
which it occurs, using annual data enables inclusion of a relatively large number of 
countries. 
For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary measures of currency 
crises, as defined above (1 = crisis, 0 = no crisis). A currency crisis is deemed to have 
occurred for a given year if the change in currency pressure for any month of that year 
satisfies our criteria (i.e. two standard deviations above the mean as well as greater than 
five percent in magnitude). To reduce the chances of capturing the continuation of the 
same currency crisis episode, we impose windows on our data. In particular, after 
identifying each “large” monthly change in currency pressure, we treat any large changes 
in the following 24-month window as a part of the same currency episode and skip the 
years of that change before continuing the identification of new crises. With this 
methodology, we identify 160 currency crises over the 1975-99 period.  
Appendices A, B, and C, respectively, provide details on the countries including 
in the developing country and emerging markets samples,  the currency (and bank) crisis 
dates, and the periods of exchange payments liberalization. 
 
4.  Descriptive Statistics and Conditional Frequencies 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics on Currency Crises, Liberalization, and Exchange Pegs 
Table 1 shows the occurrence of currency crises in developing and emerging-
market economies over the 1975-1997 period. Panel A shows the frequency of currency 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Our emerging economy sample accords roughly with Furman and Stiglitz’s variant (1998) of 
that used by Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), augmented to include Hong Kong and  19 
crises (number of crises divided by number of observations) for the full sample and 5-
year sub-sample (except for the 1995-97 sub-sample). Currency crises are a common 
occurrence. The 90 (32) countries in the full developing country (emerging market) 
sample experienced 160 (78) currency crises over the 1975-97 period. This represents a 
frequency of 11.7 percent on average for the developing economies. Crises were least 
frequent during the late 1970s (9.9 percent average frequency) and most frequent during 
the late 1980s (14.3 percent).  
The recent spate of currency crises around the world is not an uncommon event, 
and does not indicate a rise in the frequency of currency crises over time. Moreover, 
emerging markets do not appear different than other developing economies in terms of 
the frequency of currency crises. They exhibit a similar frequency of currency crises to 
that observed in the sample overall (11.3 percent), and also a similar pattern across 
periods of time.  
Panel B of Table 1 provides a geographic decomposition of the frequency of 
currency crises. Currency crises are common to all regions, and countries of every 
development status. Currency crises were most frequent in poor Africa (16.2 percent 
frequency), and least frequent in Asia (9.6 percent). (Note, however, that the figure for 
Africa may be overstated since the French Franc zone CFA countries are mostly excluded 
from the sample due to data limitations.) The same pattern holds up for both developing 
economies and emerging-market economies. Despite recent high profile and dramatic 
currency crises in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea, emerging-market economies 
in Asia have been least frequently affected by currency instability.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Uruguay but excluding China, Israel, the Ivory Coast, and Taiwan. The full developing country  20 
Table 2 shows the prevalence in our sample of liberalized restrictions on capital 
flows and other international payments. The table presents the (unconditional) frequency 
of our different measures of financial liberalization. For the full sample of developing 
economies, the highest degree of liberalization is for domestic financial liberalization 
(FinL; 46.5 percent), and least for the liberalization of measures controlling the surrender 
of export proceeds (SEL; 15 percent) and capital account liberalization (KAL; 16.2 
percent). Comparing the beginning (1975-79) and end (1995-97) of our sample, we see a 
clear trend in the 1990s towards more liberal policies irrespective of the indicator used 
for comparison.  Emerging markets show the same overall pattern as that identified in the 
full developing economy sample. 
  
4.2  Currency Crises: Frequencies Conditional on Liberalization 
Table 3 shows the frequency of currency crises conditional upon a country’s 
having liberalized its financial controls. This table sheds light directly upon the main 
hypothesis of interest: whether restrictions on capital flows (or other international 
payments) affects the probability of a currency crisis. The setup of Table 3 is similar to 
that of Table 2, listing the particular measures of financial restrictions down the rows of 
the first column. The adjacent column pairs compare, for each particular measure, the 
frequency of (country-year) observations where payments were restricted or liberalized.  
These relative frequency measures were calculated conditional on both contemporaneous 
and lagged values of liberalized controls. 
2 c  statistics for tests of the null hypothesis of 
independence between the frequency of crises and liberalized controls are also reported. 
                                                                                                                                                 
sample excludes major oil-exporting countries.   21 
In addition to the full developing country sample, results are also reported for the subset 
of emerging-market economies.  
The most striking result from Table 3 is that the country-year observations 
associated with more liberalized capital flows (and more liberal payments systems 
generally) have substantially lower frequencies of currency crises than those associated 
with restrictions. This is strong prima facie evidence in support of the Bartolini and 
Drazen (1997) hypothesis that capital account restrictions may lead to expectations of 
inconsistent policies and contribute to currency instability. This is true in every case 
regardless of the liberalization measure, contemporaneous or lagged values, or whether 
the classification is concerned with developing or emerging-market economies.  
And the differences are substantial. In the full sample of developing countries, for 
example, countries with restricted (not liberalized) capital flows using the KAL measure 
had currency problems contemporaneously for 12.7 percent of the time on average, 
compared to 6.8 percent for those not having restrictions. The 
2 c statistics reject the null 
of independence and indicate that this difference is significant (at better than 5 percent). 
The difference in currency crisis frequency according to whether the capital account 
restrictions were in place or not in the preceding year is smaller (12.3 percent versus 8.1 
percent), but is still significant at the 10 percent level. The same pattern is apparent for 
our other measures of liberalization: the lagged relationship between currency crises and 
liberalization is weaker than the contemporaneous relationship. The results for the 
emerging country sub-sample, which are generally weaker than those for the full sample, 
display the same pattern. 
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5. Probit  Results 
Our use of probit models allows us to go beyond the conditional frequencies 
reported in the previous section and to focus on the contribution of payment restrictions 
to currency crises, while controlling for other macroeconomic and institutional factors 
that vary across time and country. We estimate the probability of currency crises using a 
multivariate probit model on an unbalanced panel data set for developing and emerging-
market countries over the 1975-97 period (or years available). We observe that either a 
country at a particular time (observation t) is experiencing the onset of a crisis (i.e. the 
binary dependent variable, say yt, takes on a value of unity), or it is not (yt = 0). The 
probability that a crisis will occur, Pr(yt = 1), is hypothesized to be a function of a vector 
of characteristics associated with observation t, xt , and the parameter vector ß. The 
likelihood function of the probit model is constructed across the n observations (the 
number of countries times the number of observations for each country) and the log of 
the function is then maximized with respect to the unknown parameters using non-linear 
maximum likelihood 
[] å = - - + =
n
t t t t t x F y x F y L
1
' ' )) ( 1 ln( ) 1 ( ) ( ln ln b b  
The function F(.) is the standardized normal distribution. 
In these equations we employ a 24-month window following the onset of a crisis 
(i.e. episode of exchange rate pressure), as discussed in Section 3.4, and we eliminated 
from the dataset these observations. Following Eichengreen and Rose (1998), we use a 
weighted-probit regression where the weight is the GDP per capita. Countries with higher 
GDP per capita generally have more reliable data, and the observations are  23 
correspondingly given greater weight in the analysis. In interpretation, however, should 
be that most importance is attached to relatively high income developing economies.  
In each table we report the effect of a one-unit change in each regressor on the 
probability of a crisis (expressed in percentage points so that .01=1%), evaluated at the 
mean of the data. We include the associated z-statistics in parentheses; these test the null 
of no effect. Note that the sample size of the multivariate probit analysis varies depending 
on the set of variables considered.  
We also report various diagnostic measures. The in-sample probability forecasts 
are also evaluated with “pseudo” R
2 statistics and analogs of a mean squared error 
measure, the quadratic probability score (QPS) and log probability score (LPS), that 
evaluate the accuracy of probability forecasts. The QPS ranges from zero to 2, and the 
LPS ranges from zero to infinity, with a score of zero corresponding to perfect accuracy 
for both.
13  For dependent binary variables, it is natural to ask what fraction of the 
observations are “correctly called,” where, for example, a crisis episode is correctly 
called when the estimated probability of crisis is above a given cut-off level and a crisis 
occurs. Such “goodness-of-fit” statistics are shown for two probability cut-offs: 25 
percent and 10 percent. 
 
                                                 
13 For each of the methods we can generate n probability forecasts where Pt is the probability of a 
crisis in the period t, 01 ££ P t . Rt is the actual times series of observations; Rt  = 1 if a crisis 
occurs at time t and equals zero otherwise. The analog to mean squared error for probability 
forecasts is the QPS:  
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Large errors are penalized more heavily under the LPS, given by: 
[] LPS
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5.1 Bivariate  Probits 
Table 4 reports the results from the probit equations explaining the likelihood of 
the onset of a currency crisis in any given year given different forms of payments 
liberalization in the preceding year. The table separates out the sample of countries into 
developing countries and emerging-market economies and by the four measures of 
liberalization analyzed in the preceding section.  
The results indicate a statistically significant and economically meaningful 
negative link between liberalization and the likelihood of a future currency crisis. This 
result holds for capital account restrictions and for the three other measures of payments 
restrictions in both the developing and emerging-market economy samples. The 
likelihood of a currency crisis in developing economies (emerging-market economies) is 
reduced by 7.5 percent (9.0 percent) in the absence of restrictions on the capital account.   
 
5.2  Multivariate Probits 
Tables 5 to 7 present results linking payments restrictions to currency crises after 
controlling for a host of macroeconomic and institutional variables. Control variables 
included in Table 5 are export growth, the broad money to reserves ratio, credit growth 
and the current account to GDP ratio. Table 6 includes the major bank crisis variable 
(both current and lagged values) to the list of macroeconomic control variables. Table 7 
encompasses the most inclusive set of control variables: macroeconomic, bank crisis, and 
also the measure of exchange rate fixity.   
Table 5 reports the baseline multivariate results. All of the external (and 
domestic) liberalization measures are significant (at one percent) and negatively  25 
associated with the onset of currency crises for the full developing country sample. 
Clearly, capital account liberalization and other forms of balance of payments and 
financial liberalization are associated with a lower probability of currency instability for 
developing countries.    
The results are somewhat weaker for the emerging market sample—all of the 
liberalization variables have negative signs, but only KAL and FinL are significantly 
different from zero at conventional statistical levels of confidence. The main result still 
holds, however, in that (lagged) capital market liberalization is associated with greater 
currency stability in emerging-market economies even after controlling for 
macroeconomic conditions.   
The results are not qualitatively affected by controlling for banking crises (Table 
6) and the form of the exchange rate regime (Table 7) in addition to the macroeconomic 
variables. Control variables of note include export growth, the ratio of broad money to 
reserves, and the degree of exchange rate fixity. Low export growth and a high level of 
broad money to reserves (M2/reserves) are systemically linked to a higher likelihood of 
currency instability.  Greater fixity of exchange rates also systematically predicts a higher 
probability of a future currency crisis in both the developing economy and emerging-
market sample.  
As noted, the emerging results linking liberalization of external controls to a 
lower probability of the onset of a currency crisis is weaker than the full sample results. 
Maintaining controls has not seemingly increased the likelihood of a currency problem in 
emerging-market economies as much as in the full developing economy sample. The  26 
policy-signaling channel in emerging markets appears to be less evident, perhaps because 
of established credibility of policy and generally consistent policy design. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our results are supportive of the signaling hypothesis that the imposition of 
capital controls and other restrictions on international payments lead to a fall in 
confidence and currency flight. The results do not support the “hot money” hypothesis 
that capital controls are an effective means to prevent currency crises. We find that a 
liberal system of exchange controls and less restriction on international payments are 
associated with lower probability of an exchange rate crisis. This result is clearly evident 
in the calculation of conditional frequencies and in the context of multivariate probit 
models estimating the likelihood of the onset of a currency crisis where controls are made 
for a host of macroeconomic and institutional factors.     
A number of individual case studies and the practical experience of some central 
bankers are consistent with our findings. Fraga (1999), for example, relates his 
experience at the central bank of Brazil where he found that capital controls gave 
policymakers a false sense of security and probably allowed Brazil to avoid or postpone a 
number of important macroeconomic policy changes and structural reforms. That is, the 
imposition (existence) of capital controls may signal the introduction (continuance) of 
poorly designed economic policy and a deterioration of economic fundamentals, in turn 
inducing a capital outflow or cessation of inflow.  
Similarly, Edwards (1999b) provides an historical overview of controls, finding 
that restrictions on capital outflows have seldom worked as expected and introduce major  27 
economic distortions and lead to government corruption. Moreover, Edwards finds that 
although restrictions on inflows may potentially lengthen the maturity of foreign debt, 
they are not effective in achieving other objectives. He argues that popularity of controls 
on capital inflows as a device for reducing external vulnerability is due to “…a 
misreading of the recent history of external crises” (1999a). Valdés-Prieto and Soto 
(1996) also find that the existence of capital controls had a large negative impact on 
welfare in Chile.  
Our results are consistent with early work linking liberalization to capital inflows 
by Dooley and Isard (1980) and to the formal signaling channel of capital controls 
developed by Bartolini and Drazen (1997a,b). Extensive capital controls and other 
restrictions on exchange payments may contribute to greater vulnerability of countries to 
currency crises by leading to inconsistent policies, poor policy design and, at worst, 
substantial corruption in the financial and international sector that eventually erodes 
confidence in the exchange rate system.    28 
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Appendix A.  
Countries Included in Dataset 
Emerging Markets    Other Developing Countries 
Argentina   Belize 
Bangladesh   Bolivia 
Botswana   Burundi 
Brazil   Cameroon 
Chile   Costa  Rica 
Colombia   Cyprus 
Ecuador   Dominican  Republic 
Egypt   El  Salvador 
Hong Kong    Equatorial Guinea 
Ghana   Ethiopia 
India   Fiji 
Indonesia   Grenada 
Jordan   Guatemala 
Kenya   Guinea-Bissau 
Korea   Guyana 
Malaysia   Haiti 
Mauritius   Honduras 
Mexico   Hungary 
Morocco   Jamaica 
Pakistan   Lao  P.D.  Rep. 
Peru   Madagascar 
Philippines   Malawi 
Singapore   Mali 
South  Africa   Malta 
Sri Lanka    Mozambique 
Thailand   Myanmar 
Trinidad and Tobago    Nepal 
Tunisia   Nicaragua 
Turkey   Nigeria 
Uruguay   Panama 
Venezuela   Paraguay 
Zimbabwe   Romania 
   Sierra  Leone 
   Swaziland 
    Syrian Arab Rep. 
   Uganda 
   Zambia 
 
Note:   The “Developing Country” sample includes “Emerging Markets” and “Other Developing Countries”.  33 
Appendix B. 
Occurrences of Currency and Banking Crises 
 Currency  Crisesa  Banking Crisesb 
Argentina  1975, 1982, 1989  1980-1982, 1989-1990, 1995 
Bolivia  1981, 1983, 1988, 1991  1986-1987, 1994-1997 
Brazil  1982, 1987, 1990, 1995  1990, 1994-1996 
Chile 1985  1976,  1981-1983 
Columbia 1985  1982-1987 
Costa Rica  1981  1987 
Dominican Republic  1985, 1987, 1990   
Ecuador  1982, 1985, 1988  1980-1982, 1996-1997 
El Salvador  1986, 1990  1989 
Guatemala 1986,  1989   
Haiti 1977,  1991   
Honduras 1990   
Mexico  1976, 1982, 1985, 1994  1981-1991, 1995-1997 
Nicaragua 1993  1988-1996 
Panama   1988-1989 
Paraguay  1984, 1986, 1988, 1992  1995-1997 
Peru  1976, 1979, 1987   1983-1990 
Uruguay 1982  1981-1984 
Venezuela  1984, 1986, 1989, 1994  1994-1997 
Grenada 1978   
Guyana 1987,  1989  1993-1995 
Belize    
Jamaica  1978, 1983, 1990  1994-1997 
Trinidad & Tobago  1985, 1988, 1993   
Cyprus    
Jordan  1983, 1987, 1989, 1992   
Syrian Arab Republic  1977, 1982, 1988   
Egypt 1979,  1989  1980-1985 
Bangladesh 1975  1987-1996 
Myanmar 1975,  1977   